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THE MYTH OF THE REMEDIAL CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST 
 
 
CHARLIE WEBB
*
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Remedial constructive trusts are held out as a way for the courts to make better decisions: 
freed from the strictures of rules, courts would be better positioned to do justice on the 
facts, tailoring a remedy to the circumstances of the case.  If this were true, their rejection 
in English law would be a serious failing.  But a closer look at the relationship between 
rules and discretion suggests that it’s not true and that, when discretion is in genuine 
opposition to rule-determined decision-making, the outcome is not more justice but less.  
Moreover, when we look to the arguments of those calling for remedial constructive trusts 
to be introduced into English law and to those jurisdictions which claim to recognize them, 
this much seems to be agreed.  Such differences as there are go instead to the substantive 
rules which govern the operation of constructive trusts.  So the question English law faces 
is not whether we should recognise some ‘new model’ of constructive trust, but rather the 
more familiar inquiry into what rules are best.  In addressing this question, the idea of the 
‘remedial’ constructive trust is only an unnecessary distraction. 
 
 
I 
Trusts as Remedies 
 
Equity is, at its root, remedial law: a body of rulings, then rules, devised as ex post facto 
remedies to specific injustices.  The trust emerged as one of equity’s principal remedial 
instruments.  Yet as the practice of recognizing trusts on certain sets of facts became settled, 
individuals could not only plan their affairs in the knowledge of when such trusts would arise 
but also start to take steps to secure such outcomes.  So one who took title to a particular asset 
on the understanding that he would hold it for another’s benefit would be placed under an 
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obligation to do just that.  Once this was known, property owners were in a position to bring 
about this arrangement by making transfers on these terms.  Not only that, the courts came to 
see these trusts as responding to the owner’s intentions.  In this way, what became express 
trusts arose from these remedial origins as, what may be called, a facilitative institution.  Not 
all trusts lend themselves to this sort of recharacterization.  If I am a fiduciary and you pay me 
to exercise my powers against my principal’s interests, I’ll be required to hold that money on 
trust for my principal.  But it’s unlikely that there’s anyone in your position who takes 
advantage of this rule to ‘create’ such a trust and, even if there were, there’s no chance of the 
courts coming to treat this as the point of the rule.  Cases such as this give us a category of 
constructive trusts: trusts which arise by operation of law rather than to give effect to a 
settlor’s intentions. 
Some constructive trusts nonetheless have an affinity with express trusts.  Once the 
courts came to treat an owner’s intentions as a reason for recognizing a trust, rules were 
needed to determine how those intentions were to be identified and manifested.  The effect of 
these, or any such, rules was that there would be cases where owners intended and tried to 
bring about a trust but failed to meet the legal requirements for effective trust creation.  In 
these cases a court might simply deny the trust, leaving the legal title holder free to treat the 
asset as his own.  But alternatively the court, reluctant to endorse what looked like an unjust 
result, might recognize a trust nonetheless.  Since the formal requirements for the creation of 
a trust haven’t been met, one can understand why these trusts would, at least on occasion, be 
classed as constructive trusts.  But these were trusts which reflected the parties’ intentions and 
these constructive trustees were people who had chosen to undertake the duties the courts 
then ‘imposed’ on them. 
One application of the term ‘remedial constructive trust’ is to identify those 
constructive trusts which don’t mirror express trusts in this way.1  Understood in this way, 
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 Cf Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria [2014] UKSC 10, [2014] AC 1189, [9] (Lord Sumption JSC), 
where a distinction is drawn between two types of constructive trust and constructive trustee:  ‘The first 
comprises ‘persons who have lawfully assumed fiduciary obligations in relation to trust property, but 
without formal appointment. … [The second] comprises persons who never assumed and never 
intended to assume the status of a trustee, whether formally or informally, but have exposed themselves 
to equitable remedies by virtue of their participation in the unlawful misapplication of trust assets. … 
The intervention of equity in such cases … is purely remedial.’  (To much the same effect: Paragon 
Finance plc v D B Thakerar & Co [1999] 1 All ER 400 (CA) 408-9 (Millett LJ).)  This classification 
omits a further class of constructive trusts, which are remedial in the sense of not involving any 
assumption of trusteeship but don’t derive from a breach of any pre-existing trust or fiduciary 
relationship, such as the vendor-purchaser constructive trust or the trust arising in cases such as Re 
  3 
while there may be disagreement about the circumstances in which trusts of this kind should 
be imposed, there is no general controversy concerning their existence or legitimacy.  More 
commonly, however, references to remedial constructive trusts identify a different idea and a 
different distinction.  This is the distinction drawn by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in 
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council:
2
 
 
Under an institutional constructive trust, the trust arises by operation of law as from 
the date of the circumstances which give rise to it: the function of the court is merely 
to declare that such trust has arisen in the past.  The consequences that flow from such 
trust having arisen (including the possibly unfair consequences to third parties who in 
the interim have received the trust property) are also determined by rules of law, not 
under a discretion.  A remedial constructive trust, as I understand it, is different.  It is 
a judicial remedy giving rise to an enforceable equitable obligation: the extent to 
which it operates retrospectively to the prejudice of third parties lies in the discretion 
of the court. 
 
The difference here is not one of rationale but of technique.  So one option is for the operation 
of constructive trusts—when they arise, what they involve—to be settled by legal rules.  
Where this is so, these trusts will arise where and when the conditions set down in those rules 
are met.  Another option, however, is for the operation of these trusts to lie, to some degree, at 
the court’s discretion.  Where they do depend on such an exercise of judicial discretion, they 
will arise only where the court decides that they arise and take effect only when a court 
decides that they take effect. 
This passage also indicates what the remedial constructive trust might be thought to 
have going for it.  Since institutional trusts are the product of rules, their operation is 
inflexible and, in this sense, indiscriminate.  They arise when the rules say they arise and bind 
who the rules say they bind.  If the effects of such a trust are thought to be unfair—for 
instance to third parties who have come into contact with the relevant asset—that’s just the 
way it goes.  So long as the rule remains in place, the judge’s hands are tied and so we must 
take the rough with the smooth.  By contrast, remedial constructive trusts free the court to 
recognize a trust only where and only so far as it considers it just to do so.  In this way, these 
trusts have, so it is thought, a flexibility which enables the courts to reach better, more just, 
results.  It is for this reason that Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Westdeutsche suggested that the 
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remedial constructive trust may be a more suitable vehicle for proprietary restitution in cases 
of unjust enrichment. 
Though it is possible for a legal system to adopt each of these techniques at different 
times and in different contexts, the received wisdom is that, at present, English law adopts 
only the former, institutional model.
3
  Opposition to remedial constructive trusts has tended to 
focus on the uncertainty they would bring and concerns about the legitimacy of the courts 
assuming such a power to reallocate property.  In basing their opposition on these grounds, 
critics appear to concede that the remedial constructive trust would bring the sort of justice 
gains its proponents have claimed for it.  This concession is, I think, a mistake.  If it really 
were true that remedial constructive trusts would, or were likely to, lead to better, fairer 
decisions, then this is a places a significant burden on those who would nonetheless counsel 
against their introduction; a burden, I suggest, that their opponents have not discharged.  
Conversely, if these trusts would not after all bring about better results, they really have 
nothing going for them and the debate ends there. 
 
 
II 
Certainty, Legitimacy, Justice 
 
English courts’ rejection of the remedial constructive trust reflects a stance they have taken 
towards proprietary claims more broadly. 
 
Property rights are determined by fixed rules and settled principles.  They are not 
discretionary.  They do not depend upon ideas of what is ‘fair, just and reasonable’.  
Such concepts, which in reality mask decisions of legal policy, have no place in the 
law of property.
4
 
 
Property law can be more or less fair, more or less just and the suggestion here is not that the 
law or the courts should regard this with indifference.  But while the law aims for just 
property rules, these rules should not make any direct appeal to justice and so proprietary 
entitlements should be capable of determination without inquiry into their justness.  
Accordingly, judges resolving property disputes shouldn’t be asking what is fair, just and 
reasonable on the facts.  Cases should, one might say, be decided on the law, not on their 
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merits or, more precisely, they should be decided by laws which shut off any such 
consideration of the merits of the parties’ claims. 
Why?  One good that comes from having a legal system is in the stability and 
predictability it provides.  If we know where we stand—what options we have, what demands 
we can make of others, what demands they can make of us—we are better positioned to set 
and pursue our diverse life goals.  A principal value of private property regimes lies precisely 
in their expansion and facilitation of the choices open to communities and their individual 
members.
5
  But a real world system of laws will serve this good only where it does indeed 
provide this information and a system of private property will advance our interests only 
where our holdings are sufficiently definite, accepted and not liable to arbitrary confiscation 
or revision, so that we have some measure of confidence in what is truly ours and what we 
can do with it. 
 Sometimes the only values at stake in the law’s resolution of some practical problem 
are, or appear to be, these certainty values.  Should we drive on the left or on the right?  
There’s nothing to do other than pick one and move on.  (Though even here it is values other 
than certainty which tell us that we should discount various other options: ‘on the left in the 
mornings, right in the afternoons’, ‘whichever side you like’.)  But more often there are 
reasons for preferring one answer to another and, where there are, these reasons will be added 
to and will sometimes compete with the reasons for wanting a—any old—clear answer.  
Should the right of a beneficiary bind a purchaser for value of misapplied trust assets?  Here 
there are competing considerations, competing interests, to be weighed in coming to any 
determination.  We can come up with various answers which would give more certainty, more 
clarity than the answer English law has in fact given: ‘yes, always’, ‘no, never’, ‘only where 
the purchaser was conscious, at the point of receipt, that he was receiving proceeds of a 
breach of trust’.  The choice to go instead with the doctrine of notice is one which 
acknowledges the deficiencies of these alternatives and attempts a more just, more reasonable 
balancing of the interests of respective parties: purchasers for value will take subject to the 
beneficiary’s rights only where they should have appreciated that what they were receiving 
was misapplied trust property.  The application of this rule requires the judge not only to look 
into the facts—What did the purchaser know?  What more would he have known had he made 
additional inquiries?—but also to consider what inquiries a purchaser should make.  This 
question is not answered simply by asking what questions other purchasers typically do make 
but requires, in the end, an evaluation; a judgment of fairness, of reasonableness. 
The claim that proprietary entitlements can, in all cases, be determined without 
inquiry into what is fair, just and reasonable is, therefore, mistaken and so it is mistaken too to 
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suggest that questions of fairness, justice and reasonableness have no place in the adjudication 
of property disputes.  In any case, even where the law adopts rules which prioritize clear, 
certain outcomes over those which require a fact-sensitive inquiry into the merits of the case 
at hand, the choice of those rules is grounded in the reasonableness of promoting certainty 
over other goods and values the law might otherwise, or better, promote.  There are goods that 
come from legal certainty, but those goods are not the only goods at stake in law and 
adjudication and they have no necessary priority over those other goods and values to which 
our legal practices are or may be directed.  And so, if the uncertainty the remedial 
constructive trust would bring is to count decisively against its recognition, we would need to 
show that, in the sorts of cases in which it would be open for adoption, certainty is of 
particular importance or that the justice gains which might be made from giving courts greater 
flexibility are outweighed by the disruption this would cause to those whose interests the law 
exists to serve.  This would require a clearer articulation of what these justice gains might be 
and why giving courts greater discretion is the only or preferable means to their achievement.  
But it would also require that the value of legal certainty be not simply asserted but 
expounded.  In this regard, it is significant that many of the cases in which it has been 
suggested that remedial trusts might be a useful tool involve conduct which the law prohibits 
and seeks to discourage (eg unauthorized gains by fiduciaries) or situations the parties do not 
plan for (eg mistaken transfers, other unjust enrichments).  For in these settings, the concern 
that the law be clear so that we might arrange our affairs in its light, if applicable at all, is less 
strong. 
A similar response can be given to the argument that it would be illegitimate for 
courts to assume this sort of power to vary or reallocate property rights.  Again we can see the 
force of this objection.  No doubt it would be improper for courts to upset proprietary 
entitlements conferred by statute, so too, through the award of property rights, to undermine 
statutory schemes for the ranking of claims in insolvency.  And even when dealing with 
questions regulated only by common law, where whatever decision the court reaches would 
impact on no legislative provision or scheme, all accept that there are choices, and perhaps 
also considerations, which are not properly available to the courts but which fall within the 
exclusive competence of the legislature.  All this means, however, is that the discretion 
accorded to judges in deploying remedial constructive trusts must be, in various ways, 
limited.  Often the argument is taken further:
6
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You cannot grant a proprietary right to A who has not had it beforehand, without 
taking some proprietary right away from B.  No English court has ever had the power 
to do that, except with the authority of Parliament. 
 
Here the suggestion is that the courts are, absent statutory permission, barred from decisions 
which have any redistributive effect.  On this basis, it’s plain that according courts any sort 
discretion over the creation and scope of trusts would be illegitimate.  The problem with this 
suggestion is that it just isn’t true.  Any judicial change to the law concerning the acquisition 
or passing of property entitlements will mean a change to people’s real world property 
holdings.  Since a significant part of this law is judge made, it is plain that judges have, and 
have long had, the power to make some such changes.  This is true not least of the law of 
trusts, judge-made law redistributive not only in effect but by design.  Now remedial 
constructive trusts may be redistributive in a way or to a degree other trusts are not and so it 
may well be possible to object to remedial trusts on the basis of the sort of redistribution they 
involve.  But the argument then needs to move beyond a blanket refusal to countenance any 
form of judicial redistribution.  
So here too the challenge raised against remedial constructive trusts is not without 
merit but it is taken too far.  There are reasons to consider that certain questions are, for the 
courts, off-limits, reasons too to prefer that significant changes to the law and to individual’s 
holdings are made with Parliamentary authority.  But there are also reasons for judges faced 
with property disputes to seek to do justice to the parties and, more generally, to seek to 
develop the law in such a way as will best promote the full range of goods and values law can 
promote.  The significant portion of English property law which is judge made is not 
therefore a testament to a long-standing abuse of judicial power but, in the main, a series of 
reasonable responses to the practical questions English judges have faced, given the particular 
social and political settings against which these determinations came to be made.  If, 
therefore, introduction of the remedial constructive trust would be a development which we 
should consider beyond the courts’ proper powers, then it will not be simply on account of the 
fact that these trusts are redistributive but because of the particular redistributive mechanism 
or consequences they involve.  In any event, if the concern is with the courts’ assuming for 
themselves this particular redistributive power, the objection is not to the remedial 
constructive trust but rather to this particular route to its recognition.  If Parliament were to 
enact a statute granting courts the power to impose remedial constructive trusts, this objection 
would have no bite. 
 The case against the remedial constructive trust made by English lawyers is, in these 
ways, incomplete.  The objections they have raised are overstated and, when tempered, they 
identify concerns which, though legitimate, are hardly decisive.   Now, much the same could 
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be said of the case for remedial constructive trusts.  Here too the claim that these should be 
welcomed for the better, fairer decisions they enable comes too quickly.  Of course we should 
want courts to come to just decisions and we can understand how, in the face of rules which 
produce unjust, unfair outcomes, freeing courts from those rules could lead to better results.  
But is this in fact the situation English law is in?  And, if it is, is giving courts the sort of 
discretion remedial constructive trusts confer the only—or, if not the only, then the best—way 
of improving results?  These questions are too rarely asked, let alone answered, by those 
pushing for their adoption, judicial discretion an assumed panacea to unspecified ills. 
This latter failing may seem the more significant.  Isn’t the onus on those arguing for 
change to show why that change is needed?  Well, perhaps.  Even so, all those calling for the 
remedial constructive trust’s recognition need claim is that it would be for the better were 
English courts to have this option, this weapon in their armoury.  To make this claim good, 
it’s not necessary to say how that option should be exercised, only that there may be times 
when having it would be beneficial.  And so we can see why advocates of the remedial 
constructive trust have, in the main, spoken only in general terms about the advantages of 
discretion over rules.  If there are such advantages—if, as claimed, discretion does, at least on 
occasion, allow for better, more just, judicial decisions—then there is reason to think that this 
option is one worth having, for why would we want to rule out ever having access to those 
advantages?  Of course, this option should nonetheless be ruled out if its exercise would 
always be improper or if these gains were always outweighed by attendant harms.  This has in 
effect been the strategy of those opposed to remedial constructive trusts.  But, as we have now 
seen, those blanket objections fail and so, if opponents concede the justice gains supporters 
claim, the argument for remedial constructive trusts is won. 
 
 
III 
Rules and Discretion 
 
Remedial and institutional constructive trusts differ, so it is assumed, in kind.  Since remedial 
and institutional trusts differ on the basis that, while the operation of the latter is fixed by 
rules, the former depend on an exercise of judicial discretion, the distinction supposes a 
difference in kind between deciding by rule and having discretion.  That there is such a 
difference is sometimes doubted.
7
  Certainly there is no straight opposition between rule-
based and discretionary decision-making.  For one thing, discretion is often accorded by rules.  
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The rules (‘laws’) of cricket give the captain who wins the toss a choice—a discretion—as to 
whether his side will bat or field first.  When he makes his choice, this is both an exercise of 
discretion and an application of this rule.  Rules may not only confer discretion but also 
regulate its exercise: having a discretion is consistent with rules determining what sorts of 
considerations the decision-maker must take account of in making his choice and how those 
considerations are to be weighted or prioritized.  We see this in the way the law polices the 
exercise of trustees’ discretions, requiring decisions to be made in good faith, for proper 
purposes, and so on. 
 In these ways, decisions can be and often are both discretionary and rule-governed. 
The rules governing such decisions may indeed provide extensive direction to one’s 
determinations, significantly curtailing one’s options and the considerations upon which one’s 
decision is to be made.  But, for the decision-maker to have discretion, however many options 
they count out, those rules must stop short of specifying what option he is to take.  The rules 
of cricket provide that the captain that wins the toss gets to choose whether to bat or field, but 
they don’t tell him, and don’t purport to tell him, what choice he should make.  So too the 
legal rules regulating the exercise of trustee discretions delimit the options available to 
trustees but don’t go on to tell them what options to take.  Discretion is, therefore, marked not 
by an absence of rules bearing on one’s decision but by the fact that whatever rules bear on 
that decision don’t fully settle what it is that the decision-maker ought to do: in the final 
analysis, he must make a choice, deciding for himself between options those rules leave open. 
Saying that the decision-maker must make a choice doesn’t mean that this choice 
should or can only be arbitrary.  Nor does it mean that one choice is as good as any other.  
Exercises of discretion can be more or less reasonable (just or generous or wise or effective 
…).8  That the rules of cricket give the captain who wins the toss a discretion as to whether to 
bat or field doesn’t mean that he may not have good reasons to pick one option over the other.  
Similarly, where the law accords a discretion, it leaves the decision-maker with a range of 
options, options which are, in one sense, equal in law: equally open to the decision-maker, 
equally effective in law if and when chosen.  But the law need not and, at least typically, will 
not hold out these options as equally reasonable or choiceworthy.  By granting discretion, the 
law doesn’t signal the reasonableness of all these options but rather delegates responsibility 
for assessing their reasonableness to that decision-maker. 
This also brings out the notion of rules which is in play here.  To have discretion is to 
have a certain kind of choice, to lack discretion is to lack such choice.  (And, to repeat, having 
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a choice here doesn’t mean a choice between equals, and so doesn’t imply that any one choice 
is as good as any other or that there isn’t a single best or right choice to make.)  The essence 
of a rule—so far as rules, or rule-determined decision-making, are to be contrasted 
meaningfully with discretion—is that it accords no such choice but rather settles the practical 
question to which it is directed.  Rules are conclusive.
9
  This is no less true of those rules that 
create and regulate discretions.  Where the law grants discretion, it leaves some practical 
question unanswered.  For instance: How should I, as trustee, exercise this power of 
appointment I have been accorded?  That I have a discretion here means that the law doesn’t 
answer this question for me.  But while it doesn’t answer this question, it does answer others 
which are connected to or bear on that question: Am I entitled to make a payment to you?  
Yes, as you are within the range of objects identified by the settlor.  Is it open to me to pay 
you with a view to making you agreeable to my romantic advances?  No, the power must be 
exercised for proper purposes.  In this way, the legal rules policing the exercise of trustee 
discretions are conclusive of the practical questions they set out to answer, indeed conclusive 
too of the fact that, in the end and from the options left open to me, the choice is mine to 
make.  
A decision-maker who is granted discretion may be provided with a wide range of 
options or he may be left with a choice of only two.  The reasons to which he may appeal may 
be more or less circumscribed.  One can, in these ways, have more or less discretion.  In law, 
the scope of discretion is determined by the reach of the legal rules which bear on such 
decisions.  But while the extent to which a particular decision is rule-governed or 
discretionary is a matter of degree, the difference between decisions which are fully 
determined by rules and those where the decision-maker has any measure of discretion is 
indeed a difference in kind.  If institutional and remedial constructive trusts are distinguished 
on this basis then the difference between the two is likewise one of kind. 
 
 
IV 
Making Law 
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If, however, remedial constructive trusts are those whose operation is in any measure at the 
discretion of the courts, doesn’t this undermine the claim that English law recognizes no 
examples of the remedial constructive trust?   It is hardly credible to suggest that the courts 
never have and never exercise discretion when dealing with constructive trust cases.  
Nonetheless, I think it’s right to say that the constructive trusts recognized in English law are 
all properly classed as institutional rather than remedial.  To see why requires a closer look at 
the sorts of discretionary powers courts may have.  This will then give us a clearer 
understanding of what it means to say that the operation of remedial constructive trusts but 
not institutional constructive trusts is at the discretion of the court. 
In law, there is no discretion without rules, rules which confer and delimit that 
discretion.  But it is also true that, with few exceptions, we don’t get legal rules without 
discretion.  Law—positive law—is man-made and man-made law is, at least in the main, 
made in exercise of law-making powers.
10
  These law-making powers will be regulated by 
law, with laws not only determining the scope of these powers but imposing duties on law-
makers in relation to their exercise.  On occasion, these duties may go so far as to determine 
what law is to be made: legislators may, for instance, owe a duty to translate into domestic 
law the enactments of some supra-national institution or to adopt the recommendations of a 
state-sponsored law reform body.  But more commonly the content of laws made by law-
making officials will not be legally pre-determined in this way but will be chosen by those 
officials in exercise of a discretionary law-making power.  In a common law system, the 
officials with such law-making discretion include some judges, with new laws made through 
the rulings they make when deciding cases.
11
 
 Accordingly for there to be institutional—rule-determined—constructive trusts, there 
will need to be officials with the power to make the legal rules which govern their operation.  
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 Can law be made other than through the exercise of a law-making power?  This depends on how 
broadly one is willing to stretch the idea of a law-making power.  Some law derives from custom and 
customary norms don’t derive from any exercise of law-making power.  But these norms become law 
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the product of any exercise of a legal power or discretion.  And since this rule will (typically) not be 
chosen but will instead emerge through the practices of members of that community, who, often un-
self-consciously, come to act and decide as though there is such a rule, one might say that the rule does 
not even result from the exercise of some pre- or extra-legal power: see generally John Gardner, ‘Some 
Types of Law’ in Douglas E Edlin, Common Law Theory (Cambridge University Press 2007). 
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Having such powers will, in turn, ordinarily mean having a discretion as to their exercise.  In 
English law the makers of the law of constructive trusts are the judges, acting, self-
consciously or not, in exercise of their law-making powers.  Nor should we think that this 
judicial law-making power is, in relation to constructive trusts, no more than historic.  In FHR 
European Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC, the Supreme Court addressed the 
question of when assets acquired in breach of fiduciary duty will be held on constructive trust 
for the principal.
12
  The position that had emerged from the previous cases was that there 
would be a trust where the principal already had a beneficial interest in the asset at the point 
of its receipt by the fiduciary and where the relevant asset was obtained by the fiduciary by 
exploiting an opportunity which he should have exploited for the principal’s benefit, but not 
in other cases.  This meant no trust would arise over bribes and secret commissions received 
by the fiduciary, with the principal limited to a personal claim to their monetary value.
13
  The 
court in FHR decided that this position was unsatisfactory and so declared that a constructive 
trust would arise in all such cases, overruling those cases which had held otherwise. 
 The power the court exercised in FHR to depart from those earlier decisions and set 
the law on a new course was law-given.  But how that power should be exercised was not a 
question that found its answer in the positive law.  So, while the court worked its way through 
the case law and though it stressed that its decision was in keeping with an older line of 
authority, its decision was in the end grounded in ‘considerations of practicality and 
principle’, which is to say, on an assessment of the merits of alternative approaches to these 
cases.
14
 
Here then we have an example of a court exercising a discretionary law-making 
power and, in this way, the trust recognised in FHR was one which arose from the exercise of 
this discretion.  Nonetheless the court didn’t think of this trust as a remedial constructive 
trust.
15
  Why was this?  Institutional constructive trusts are, as we’ve seen, those whose 
operation is fully determined by rules, such that when the conditions identified in the rule are 
present, the trust arises without need for further decision or assessment.  The upshot of FHR 
is that there is now a rule that provides that, wherever fiduciaries receive assets in breach of 
their fiduciary duties, they will hold those assets on constructive trust for their principals, the 
trust arising at the point those assets are received.  This is the rule applied to the facts in FHR.  
The recognition of this trust is discretionary only in the sense that the decision to adopt this 
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rule involved the exercise of a discretion.  If this rule had been enacted by Parliament and 
subsequently applied by the court in FHR, all this would be beyond doubt.  That there is any 
possibility of confusion here comes about only because judicial law-making involves a court 
doing two things at once: choosing a rule and applying it. 
The clearest sort of judicial law-making involves making new legal rules, whether by 
introducing a rule where none existed previously or, more commonly, and as was the case in 
FHR, by replacing one rule with another.  But much judicial law-making is of a different 
kind.  The idea, or ideal, of rule-determined decision-making is for there to be a rule which 
fully settles the relevant decision, so requiring no choice by the decision-maker and hence no 
appeal to or inquiry into other considerations, no assessment of various options on their 
merits.  Rules do this by identifying what decision is to be made on what facts, such that, once 
we know the rule and we know the facts, we have all the information we need to know what 
we should decide.   
All such rules, therefore, aspire to the same form: [facts] A + B + C … = [legal 
conclusion] X.  But aspiration isn’t always reality.  So, as mentioned earlier, a recipient of 
misapplied trust assets will hold them on trust for the beneficiary unless he is a bona fide 
purchaser for value without notice.  Whether a purchaser has notice depends not only on what 
he knows but also what he should have known.  What he should have known turns on the 
questions he should have asked and what he would have learned had he asked them.  So what 
inquiries should a purchaser make?  The law’s answer: reasonable inquiries.  But this is 
effectively to say that the purchaser should ask the questions he should ask and the problem is 
that what these questions are will vary from case to case.  Of course, some guidance will be 
found in the cases which have themselves had to address this question and so, in certain 
ordinary, repeat kinds of transaction, it’s clear what questions are to be asked.  But not every 
case fits into some such established pattern and, in those cases which don’t, the law 
effectively runs out.  We have a rule which sets out the settle the question of when a 
purchaser will be bound by the beneficiary’s interest but that rule is, in these cases, 
indeterminate, its content and application on these facts as yet unsettled.
16
 
Any court faced with such a case is therefore confronted with a question to which the 
positive law provides no answer.  Whatever answer the court gives takes it beyond existing 
law and so involves an exercise of discretion, choosing an interpretation or development of 
the rule it adjudges reasonable all things considered.
17
  Through this exercise of discretion, the 
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court not only answers a question left open by the under-determined rule but also adds to that 
rule, making it (more) determinate.  This too is a form of judicial law-making, making law not 
by setting down new legal rules but by filling in gaps in existing rules.  Accordingly, the 
determinations made by the courts in these cases are not ad hoc supplements to the relevant 
rules.  Rather they settle the content of those rules not only for the case at hand but for all 
materially like cases to follow. 
In this instance the indeterminacy of the rule and hence the need for courts to have 
and to exercise this sort of rule-making or rule-completing discretion is a consequence of the 
practical impossibility of framing in advance a fully determinate rule which deals justly which 
all the cases that fall within its ambit.  What constitute reasonable inquiries is so dependent on 
the circumstances of the case and the range of circumstances to which the rule applies is so 
great that the best the law can do is to leave much of the work of spelling out this rule to the 
courts as and when they are faced with such claims.  Elsewhere however this sort of rule-
completing discretion is a consequence of a prior rule-making failure.  Pennington v Waine 
concerned an unsuccessful attempt to transfer legal title to some shares.
18
  The shareholder 
executed a share transfer form identifying her nephew as the intended donee.  However she 
failed to pass it on to him or to the company so that he may be registered as the new 
shareholder, handing it instead to a representative of the company’s auditors.  It was accepted 
that this wasn’t sufficient to pass legal title.  The question for the court was whether a 
constructive trust nonetheless arose in the nephew’s favour.  Previous cases had held that such 
a trust would arise only where the donor had done everything within his power to make the 
transfer of title effective.
19
  This wasn’t the case here since the donor had handed over the 
share transfer form to the wrong person.  Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal held that she did 
indeed hold the shares on constructive trust for her nephew. 
In coming to this decision, the court exercised a law-making discretion like that 
exercised by the Supreme Court in FHR, adopting a new legal rule which had the effect of 
extending an established class of constructive trust to a further set of cases.  But what is the 
new rule it set down?  Here, in contrast to FHR, things are muddy.  Arden LJ considered that 
it would have been unconscionable had the donor changed her mind and attempted to resile 
from the transfer and so equity would intervene to ensure that she couldn’t do so.  This is 
what the imposition of the trust did.  Clarke LJ held that, in the circumstances, the completion 
of the share transfer form was sufficient to effect an equitable assignment of the shares, no 
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matter what then happened to that form.  But the court identified no broader test or principle 
which identified when, for other types of asset, a failed attempt to transfer legal title would 
amount to a successful equitable assignment nor which would determine when, on differing 
facts, it would be unconscionable for a donor to go back on an intended gift.  ‘There can be no 
comprehensive list of factors which makes it unconscionable for the donor to change his or 
her mind: it must depend on the court’s evaluation of all the relevant considerations.’20 
Here then we have a rule: a constructive trust will arise as a result of a failed attempt 
to convey legal title where it would be unconscionable for the donor to resile from his 
intended gift and keep the asset for himself.  We know from the cases which preceded 
Pennington that it will be considered unconscionable for a donor to seek to resile from a gift 
once he has done everything within his power to make the transfer of legal title effective and 
so a trust will arise in these instances.  But what we don’t know is in what other 
circumstances will such a trust arise.  Pennington tells us that there are such circumstances 
and provides us with one such example.  Beyond this, however, it offers very little guidance 
for later courts charged with applying this new rule.  In turn, these courts have no option but 
to flesh out this rule for themselves, making their own determinations as to how the rule 
should be understood and applied. 
So the upshot of Pennington is that it leaves us with a significantly indeterminate 
rule, which, unless and until it is replaced, will make for more cases in which the courts are 
required to exercise law-making, rule-completing discretion.  But this indeterminacy, in 
contrast to the indeterminacy we find in the bona fide purchase rule, doesn’t seem to be an 
inevitable and acceptable cost of the law’s attempt to regulate a complex or diverse array of 
circumstances or to synthesize a range of considerations.  True, cases of imperfect gifts differ 
in various dimensions: the reasons for its failure, the nature of the asset, the circumstances of 
the would-be recipient, and so on.  But there’s nothing in Pennington, or for that matter in the 
earlier cases, to give us cause to think that these differences should stop us being able to 
articulate clearly the reasons the law may have for recognizing trusts in such cases or that 
their application across a range of diverse fact patterns involves any particular complexity or 
unpredictability.  In turn, this means that there is nothing stopping us from devising a rule 
which provides a just and reasonable response to these cases without any significant 
uncertainty or indeterminacy.  Perhaps the most likely explanation for the court’s failure to 
offer any clear and convincing rationale for the trust in Pennington is that there is no such 
rationale to be found.  At best, Pennington passes the buck, leaving later courts to flesh out a 
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rule which can account for the ruling in Pennington while providing a just and workable 
response to other cases of imperfect gifts.
21
 
So it wasn’t necessary for the court in Pennington to adopt such a slack, 
indeterminate rule and the wide discretion courts now have in determining when equity will 
perfect imperfect gifts serves no useful purpose.  But we shouldn’t think that the law can ever 
get by without courts exercising some such discretion.  There are inevitably indeterminacies 
in the language in which rules are expressed, in the intentions of rule-makers and in the 
reasons to which they appeal.  As a result there are no fully determinate legal rules.
22
  The 
rule set down in FHR may be not only more just but also more certain than the rule it 
replaced.  But there remain cases where its application remains uncertain, unsettled.  
Applying the rule that all assets received in breach of fiduciary duty are held, from the point 
of receipt, on constructive trust for the principal requires that we know who is a fiduciary and 
what constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty.  Sometimes we don’t.  Accordingly, while legal 
rules can be more or less determinate, leaving a correspondingly smaller or greater number of 
questions to be settled by those called on to apply those rules, that they will inevitably be 
indeterminate in some measure means that courts will always have some discretion to 
determine their content and application. 
 
 
V 
Alternative Strategies 
 
Rule-determined and discretionary decision-making represent distinct techniques, distinct 
strategies for coming to decisions.  The ideal of rule-determined decision-making is of a 
system of rules which fully resolves all relevant practical questions, such that, once those 
rules are in place and the facts known, the decision-maker knows what he is to do without 
further inquiry.  Discretionary decision-making differs in that it rejects this aim.  While it has 
rules which exist to guide the decision-maker, these rules stop short—and stop short by 
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design—of settling the decision he is to reach.  Instead this strategy sees that the decision-
maker is left with a range of options from which he is to choose, the choice requiring that 
decision-maker to undertake his own assessment of their merits. 
 To adopt the first of these strategies is to commit to an ongoing project.  This is true 
not only in the sense that rule-determined decision-making is a strategy for making decisions 
extending over a period of time but, more fundamentally, for the reason that the choice of 
rules is itself ongoing, indeed unending.  Rules which were necessary or apt at one point in 
time and in one setting may later, when circumstances change, cease to be appropriate; those 
which appeared just or practical may, on reflection, come to be seen as deficient.  More to the 
point, no set of man-made rules will be wholly free of ambiguity, none will be capable of 
providing fully determinate answers to all questions they address.  Any such set rules will 
necessitate continuing interpretation and supplementation, requiring on each occasion further 
choices to be made.  We see this in law and in particular in common law.  Lines of cases now 
considered outdated or mistaken are overruled or distinguished.  Solutions are fashioned for 
new, or newly recognized, problems.  Old doctrines get novel rationales.  The law keeps 
moving.   
Rule-determined decision-making, as such a strategy, is, therefore, compatible with 
decision-makers retaining discretion over the content of these rules.  More importantly, it 
requires it.  The power to change rules can be taken away from those charged with applying 
those rules and assigned instead to some independent body.  But since some measure of 
indeterminacy is an unavoidable consequence of any set of man-made rules, it is likewise 
unavoidable that decision-makers will, on occasion, face questions which those rules do not 
answer.  Where they do, there is no option but to choose, no way out other than to have and to 
exercise discretion. 
Under both strategies, therefore, decision-makers will sometimes face questions to 
which no rule provides an answer.  Where the strategies differ is in how they see and respond 
to such cases.  For a system of rule-determined decision-making, indeterminate rules are a 
practical inevitability and are in any case sometimes reasonably chosen, given the limited 
time and information available to rule-makers and the difficulty of framing ex ante (more) 
determinate general rules which adequately address the range of circumstances and concerns 
in play.  Nonetheless, the ambition is to have or to develop conclusive, fully determinative 
rules.  Accordingly, where the indeterminacy of a rule requires the decision-maker to make a 
determination of his own, that determination is appended to or subsumed within that rule, 
settling the question not just for this decision-maker in this case but also for other decision-
makers in other cases.  In this way, indeterminate rules are progressively made more 
determinate as various questions left unanswered by those rules as initially formulated receive 
answers in the concrete determinations of individual decision-makers. 
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Under a system of discretion, by contrast, the objective is not to provide conclusive 
direction but to keep some questions open.  Accordingly, where the rules run out and the 
decision-maker is left to choose for himself, the decision he then makes isn’t incorporated 
within those rules.  The discretion the decision-maker exercises in making such a decision 
doesn’t resolve any indeterminacy or incompleteness in the relevant rule: the rule stays as it 
was, its content unchanged.  So in a system of discretion, the questions the rules leave open 
stay open.  Each time such a question arises, the decision-maker is invited to decide afresh 
what he should do.  The discretion accorded by the rules of cricket to the captain who wins 
the toss works like this.  If, having won the toss, I decide today that my side shall bat first, I 
am not bound by this decision or by my reasons next time I face this choice and nor is anyone 
else. 
The difference between institutional and remedial constructive trusts is, as we saw at 
the outset, one of strategy or technique.  The technique of adopting and applying rules which 
fully determine, or which seek to fully determine, where and how such trusts operate is the 
technique of the institutional constructive trust.  The choice of this strategy doesn’t presume 
that these rules won’t need to be revised or refined, nor does it foreclose their revision or 
refinement.  Accordingly it doesn’t demand that we deny judges discretion when it comes to 
recognizing such trusts.  All it requires is that this discretion is always in the service of 
devising or developing such rules.  So where a court makes constructive trust law—whether 
by recognizing a new category of constructive trust, or by modifying the rules on some 
established class of such trusts, or by filling in a gap in such rules—its decision involves an 
exercise of discretion.  But the presence and exercise of this sort of judicial discretion doesn’t 
make these trusts any less institutional.  The discretion this technique lacks—the discretion 
remedial constructive trusts must claim if they are to differ from institutional trusts—is the 
sort of ongoing and repeated freedom of choice accorded where rules are rejected. 
The difference in practice is this: imagine I, as judge, am called on to decide whether 
a constructive trust should be recognized on a given set of facts (say, the claimant has paid the 
defendant a significant sum of money by mistake and the question is whether that money is 
held on trust for the claimant).  Assume there is no rule in place which settles how I should 
decide this case.  Perhaps no court has previously had to consider this question; perhaps no 
clear or coherent answer emerged from those who have.  On any view, whatever strategy I 
adopt, I can get to an answer only by looking beyond the existing rules and making a 
determination of my own, one made on the merits.  Where the two strategies differ is in what 
comes next.  On the institutional model that determination makes law, settling the question of 
whether recipients of mistaken payments hold that money on trust for their payers, unless and 
until that rule is changed by some other official in exercise of a law-changing discretion.  On 
the remedial model, by contrast, the next judge who is confronted with such a claim would be 
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in substantially the same position as I was and faces the same choice I faced.  There remains 
no rule, no law which settles whether a trust arises on these facts and so this judge must 
likewise make his own determination on the merits.  Now that judge may well reach the same 
decision I did.  The reasons which struck me as sound may strike him as sound.  More to the 
point, he may reasonably take the fact of my decision as giving him reason to decide the same 
way, since he sees the value of predictability and certainty and the justice of treating like 
cases alike.  Nonetheless, the law’s position would be that there is no requirement that he 
does so.  The choice, as it were, is his. 
If this is the strategy which distinguishes the remedial constructive trust, it puts the 
suggestion that remedial trusts allow the courts to reach better results in a different light.  
First, there is nothing in the nature of the institutional constructive trust which prevents it 
from being used to reach the very same just outcomes remedial constructive trusts supposedly 
enable.  Wherever we think justice would be done by the imposition of a trust, an institutional 
constructive trust, given appropriately framed rules, can bring about that result.  Institutional 
and remedial constructive trusts, as we have seen, reflect different techniques, different 
strategies for coming to judicial decisions.  But these different strategies for decision-making 
don’t compel different decisions. 
Second, while the value of treating like cases alike is one a judge is free to appeal to 
when exercising his ongoing discretion under a remedial constructive trust, this value is, we 
might say, built in to the institutional constructive trust.  The very idea of deciding by rule 
entails a commitment to this basic aspect or condition of justice and to the ideas of equality 
and rational constancy it embodies.
23
  Of course, there can be bad rules, rules which work 
injustice, and sticking to those rules will often do more injustice than deviating from them.  
But while there can be injustice with rules, there cannot be justice without them, without, that 
is, the commitment to the like treatment of like cases which is their hallmark. 
This doesn’t mean that giving courts discretion guarantees injustice.  Discretion is not 
a mandate to treat like cases differently.  As we’ve seen, a judge with discretion must make 
his own determination of justice and reasonableness.  Since justice demands that like cases be 
treated alike, any reasonable exercise of discretion will likewise see that like cases get like 
treatment.  But what this shows is that discretionary decision-making will do justice only if 
decision-makers nonetheless decide as though there were a rule in place.  The upshot is that 
discretionary decision-making differs from rule-determined decision-making by leaving open 
an option—the option to treat like cases differently—no judge should take. 
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VI 
Choosing Rules 
 
The English law of constructive trusts is not in a state of perfection.  The rules the courts have 
developed are in various ways less than fully reasonable and, on occasion, do injustice to 
those they affect.  It may be that, in some places, we would be better off with no rules at all 
than to continue on with the unjust rules we have.  This is the medicine of the remedial 
constructive trust.  But it is a medicine grounded in a misdiagnosis of the problem.  For where 
the law’s rules cause injustice, the source of this injustice is not the choice of deciding by rule 
but rather the rules chosen.  Discretion, as a technique of judicial decision-making, has no 
justice advantage over rule-determined decision-making.  There is no just outcome or process 
which the choice of rules as a technique shuts off, no justice which can be done only by 
discretion.  These different techniques identify different means of decision-making, not 
different ends.  So there is simply no justice gain in rejecting institutional constructive trusts 
and the commitment to rules they involve.  Indeed, if we want to see justice done, making the 
like treatment of like cases optional rather than obligatory is a step back, not a step forward.  
In law, the solution for bad rules is better rules, not their rejection. 
 English law has, therefore, been right to reject the remedial constructive trust.  But it 
has, in the main, got to the right answer for the wrong reasons.  Conversely, those who have 
pushed for the recognition of remedial constructive trusts might be said to have got to the 
wrong answer for the right reasons.  English property lawyers have been far too quick to bat 
away calls for the law to move closer to some demand of justice by insisting that this would 
cause intolerable uncertainty or simply that it is not the sort of thing the courts should be 
doing.  But remedialists have in turn been too ready to believe that various persistent 
problems within property law would dissolve if only courts were given greater discretion.  
One problem with this way of thinking is that discretion comes in different varieties and can 
extend to different questions, yet those advocating greater discretion rarely go on to say what 
sort of discretion courts should be given, still less to say how they think it should be 
exercised.  This failure is evident in the arguments of those who have supported the 
introduction of remedial constructive trusts, where there’s often a mismatch between what 
they say they are arguing for and the arguments they in fact make. 
So, as we’ve seen, the remedial constructive trust is explicitly identified as a new 
model of constructive trust, different in kind to the institutional trusts presently found in 
English law.  The distinguishing feature of this new model of constructive trusts is the 
discretion it accords to the courts over their imposition and operation.  But what sort of 
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discretion would truly distinguish these trusts from standard institutional trusts?  Not, as I 
have argued, discretion to make new and improved legal rules, for this is precisely a 
discretion to recognize new institutional constructive trusts and is, in any case, a discretion 
the courts have already.  The same goes for the sort of rule-completing discretion exercised 
when courts are called on to apply indeterminate rules.  If the remedial constructive trust is, as 
claimed, something new and distinct from the institutional constructive trust, then the 
discretion it provides must be the kind that results from the rejection of rules and rule-
determined decision-making.  And, as we’ve seen, once we abandon rules, we abandon the 
commitment to the like treatment of like cases they entail. 
 Unsurprisingly, lawyers hailing the remedial constructive trust as a cure for manifold 
injustices have not insisted on the justice of treating like cases differently.  Quite the contrary.  
The importance of discretion being exercised in accordance with established principles and 
common standards is routinely proclaimed, which gets us very near to an endorsement of the 
importance of like cases being treated alike.
24
  Instead, the discretion they end up arguing for 
is a combination of the two sorts of law-making discretion discussed earlier: the introduction 
of a broad power to impose constructive trusts in situations not presently covered by 
established institutional trusts, with the circumstances in which such trusts are recognized to 
be developed incrementally by the courts in full consideration of the circumstances of the 
case.
25
  The idea of the remedial constructive trust which stands in true opposition to the 
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institutional constructive trust and its commitment to decision by rules may not even have the 
support of its own advocates. 
 It may be, therefore, that there is an unwitting consensus in favour of rules and the 
technique, if not the markings, of the institutional trust.  If so, the only question is what rules 
we should have.  Indeed we may do better to read the debate over remedial constructive trusts 
as a debate about different styles of rule and rule-making.  As we have seen, rules can be 
more or less open-textured, more or less determinate.  Advocates of remedial constructive 
trusts might then be regarded as favouring more loosely-framed, open-textured rules, leaving 
much of their content to be hammered out in the cases by the courts.  Sometimes there is no 
option but to frame rules in loose terms, for instance where the question the rule seeks to 
answer is one of degree—How much care must I take when driving?  How much force can I 
use against this assailant?—or where the law seeks to accommodate a range of considerations 
which point in differing directions—think for instance of the law’s ‘tests’ for identifying 
duties of care.  Even when a law-maker is in a position to frame a rule of greater precision 
and determinacy, there may still be something to be said for delegating some of this law-
making to judges who can see better the full range of circumstances to which the rule will 
apply and the concrete implications of differing applications or interpretations of that rule.  At 
other times, however, indeterminate rules reflect indecision: the choice of an open-ended rule 
the consequence of not knowing what rule to choose, with the cost needless uncertainty.
26
 
So there is no one-size-fits-all model for good legal rules and good legal rule-making 
and the question of what degree of indeterminacy we should welcome or tolerate is a question 
which, like all other questions about the proper content of such rules, can only be answered 
on the merits, by consideration of the goods and values the law may promote and how they 
best be served.  These are the questions trust lawyers should be addressing.  When addressing 
them, they will have no need for the idea of the remedial constructive trust. 
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